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Introduction
Operation Overlord, the June 6, 1944 Allied invasion of Western Europe, was an undertaking of immense proportion and risk. The largest amphibious assault ever, its success meant defeat for Nazi Germany. Failure, however, could have been as equally dramatic. With the Allies defeated on the shores of northern France, Hitler would have been granted a reprieve of strategic magnitude. The Germans could have transferred decisive power to the Russian front to significantly increase the chance of stalemate and compromise with the Russians 1 . Unconditional German surrender, the Allies' desired outcome for the war, would be at risk. To maximize their opportunities for success, the Allies designed and integrated into Operation Overlord sophisticated deception schemes designed to mislead and confuse the enemy. Known collectively as deception plan Bodyguard, these schemes contributed significantly to the success of Overlord by inducing the Germans to inefficiently deploy their military assets throughout western Europe.
Operation Overlord and deception plan Bodyguard occupy extremes in terms of scale and success. Overlord took place in the context of total conventional world war and the success of deception plan Bodyguard has been described as the greatest achieved by any deception plan. Modern Commanders should tailor their expectations of what Operational Deception can do for them by using deception plan Bodyguard as the standard and then measuring how well they have developed their deception relative to the standard.
Deception planning is not something that comes easily to American war fighters. Its tedious and timeconsuming nature runs counter to the 'American Way of War'. However, deception should be embraced because it can be a war winning force multiplier that saves lives. With the American public's abhorrence of battlefield casualties, deception is an asset that should be used to the maximum extent possible. Deception plan Bodyguard also serves as a cautionary tale to those who would use deception. If one has not prepared to the degree and scope that Allied deception planners were for the invasion of Normandy, one could resoundingly fail. When done well enough however, counter to conventional wisdom, Bodyguard teaches that deception planning can be used to the point of risking operational success upon the success of the deception plan. To do so, as demonstrated at Normandy, requires the extraordinary ability to see inside the decision making process of your enemy's critical decision makers. Key to this ability is a deception model that makes the enemy as transparent and unaware as possible.
Planning
Deception planning is not something that comes easily to American war fighters.
Americans have never embraced the concept. Deception runs counter to the American way of war because it violates the spirit and intent of offensive combat. The American way of war prefers overwhelming firepower, high tech weaponry, and numerical superiority. Because this way is so successful, devoting human, financial and material resources to deception is argued to be a waste of assets 2 .
Not only does deception run counter to the American way of war, it also runs counter to the average American character. Deception planning is tedious and detail oriented, requiring much patience. Done properly, as was the case for Bodyguard, the effort must start at the top with the Operational Commander and cover all three levels of war (strategic/operational/tactical), coordinating with functional areas such as Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, C2
Warfare, and Operational Fires. The deception plan must also be subordinate to and integrated into the Operational
Plan. This need for cross functional coordination and full examination by the entire chain of command exceeds the level of detail and patience the average American planner is willing to devote.
But if the process is so difficult, why ultimately use deception? Because deception can be a tremendous force multiplier and life saver. In the case of Bodyguard, it caused the Germans to falsely estimate the wounded Allied casualties. Actual figures were 2,500 killed and 12,000 wounded with 129,0000 Allied troops safely ashore 6 . Lastly, successful deception greatly supports surprise, one of the 9 principles of war. Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt, Normandy Operational Commander, "could not believe that the Allies were to land only south of the Seine." 7 Normandy had to be a feint. The surprise was complete.
Measuring Effectiveness: Deception as an Input/Output Model
The more an Operational Commander risks operational success on deception success, the more urgent the need to measure or estimate the potential effectiveness of the deception. Just as Plato held his ideal forms, Operational
Commanders should regard deception plan Bodyguard as an ideal form worth emulation. The Allies risked much with their invasion of Normandy. They realized that if German forces were able to reinforce wherever the invasion force landed in northern France the entire effort might fail 8 . However as events drew close to June 6, 1944 , their great anxiety was lessened by their invaluable knowledge that their deception plans continued to function as desired.
Viewed from a systems perspective, deception effectiveness can be explained as a simple Input/Output model. In this model, the system output signal represents the deception story which targets enemy decision makers.
The input signal back to the friendly Operational Commander is the observed enemy reaction to the output signal or deception story. Effectiveness expressed here is in terms of estimations. Actual deception effectiveness can not be known until after execution.
The effectiveness of the output signal or deception story depends on 3 variables. Deception stories can be effective only when they are aimed at the proper person: the enemy Operational Commander. Secondly, the output signal must be directed at all enemy intelligence gathering means, specifically focusing on the most favored. Thirdly, the deception story must be as believable as possible to the enemy. The key to enabling such credibility is to maximize knowledge of enemy expectations. The more one understands what the enemy anticipates, the easier it becomes to
falsely show him what he expects to see. The "carrier wave" for the deception story or the means by which the story is broadcast is known as the deception means. Deception means can also be described in terms of "spectrum". Spectrum in this case describes the quality, variety, volume, and subtlety of the deception means. The higher the fidelity of the "spectrum", the better the deception means.
The clarity of the input signal into the model or ability to see how the enemy reacts to deception depends on the source and quality of the input signal as well as the speed of receipt and confidence in it. The higher the quality of such variables, the more optimized the input signal becomes and the more transparent the enemy's decision-making process becomes. More plainly, as was the case for the Allies, if one is able to read decrypted messages from an unwitting Hitler only hours after transmission, the clarity of your input signal is outstanding as is the transparency or insight into enemy decision making. In this case the source (Hitler), quality (ULTRA intel), speed (within hours), and confidence (unwitting implies no counter deception) are of the highest order. The closer one approaches this level of effectiveness, the more acceptable risk the Operational Commander can assume in his operational scheme and the more he can depend on deception to deliver operational success. See Figure 1 below. 9 . In the case of the Allies, the former was the logical choice due to the fact that they held so much accurate intelligence on German expectations and preconceptions concerning the invasion of western Europe. This course allowed them to maximize the plausibility of their stories, which is essential to the success of any deception plan. Allied planners were well aware that "Hitler called
Norway the 'zone of destiny of the war'" and designed Fortitude North (see Table 1 ) to exploit those concerns 10 . Correspondingly, because the Balkans provided the gateway to German oil supplies in Romania,
Zeppelin (see Table 1 ) was designed to play on Germans fears regarding their security. In regards to planning for Fortitude South (see Table   1 ), factor space contributed to German expectations that Pas de Calais would be the true invasion location. Pas de Calais represented the shortest invasion route from England and offered the most direct route to the Ruhr Valley and the industrial heart of Germany. Lastly, the nearby port of Le Harve was outstanding and could serve as a logistics loghead to sustain the Allied drive across France and into Germany 11 .
Bodyguard was the overarching strategic level deception plan designed to "induce the enemy to make faulty strategic dispositions in relation to operations by the United Nations against Germany agreed upon at EUREKA." 12 .
By presenting false invasion threats throughout western Europe, the goal was to induce the Germans to misallocate their resources by needlessly reinforcing places the Allies would not attack:
northern Italy, the Balkans, Greece, and Scandinavia. If German troops remained in these places, they could not oppose Allied forces when they came ashore in France. A simple but powerful idea. Bodyguard was comprised of a constellation of lesser stories summarized in Table 1 and Figure 2 .
In essence all the stories except for Fortitude South were ambiguity type stories, designed to make the Germans think the invasion could occur anywhere. Fortitude South was a misleading story, designed to make the Germans think the invasion would occur someplace other than it would: Pas de Calais vice Normandy 13 . 
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Aimed at Proper Source
The best planned deception will fail if not directed at the proper target: Those with the ability to make strategic or operational decisions. Thus, the enemy Commander becomes the deception target. 23 Bodyguard correctly targeted both the Oberkommando der Werhmacht (OKW) or German High Command and Hitler. 24 To work best, one must know the enemy's most trusted means to gather intelligence and then direct the deception effort towards those means, taking pains to ensure that it appears to arrive naturally. 25 The Germans favored means of gathering intelligence was through their England based spy network, which unfortunately for them, had been "turned" by the Allies. By 1941 all Abwehr (German Intelligence) agents in England had been identified and either neutralized or assimilated into the XX or Double Cross Committee. 26 That is, they had become Double Agents. Throughout the war the Germans were none the wiser and in fact some of these agents were considered to be of the "highest reliability by the OKW." 27 Double
Agents became the Abwehr's and, by extension, Hitler's primary source of intelligence for the Western front.
Bodyguard leveraged this advantage to the maximum, using Double Agents as the central means to convey the various deception stories which shrouded Overlord. These "output" signals should be considered of the highest order because they directly influenced enemy decision making at the highest level.
Factor force also contributed to the deception by largely denying the Germans the ability to crosscheck the information being fed to them by their "most trusted" spies. Because of Allied air superiority, German aerial reconnaissance, which could have discredited the British Double Agents, could not because it had been too restricted over England since 1941. 31 
Spectrum of Deception Means
Just as knowing enemy preconceptions and fears are critical to drafting plausible story lines, resources devoted towards conveying the deception story are just as critical. If the volume and variety of the "spectrum" carrying the message is not sufficiently believable to the enemy, the deception will fail no matter how plausible the story. A prime issue facing Allied deception planners was how to convey the military forces intrinsic in their deception stories. Two courses could have been pursued. In the first, real forces could have been drawn away from actual combat units and used in the deception effort.
Unfortunately for the Allies, they were opposing a German force of such magnitude that actual combat forces dedicated only to deception was not desirable.
Fortunately, however, decrypted German message traffic revealed they were susceptible to the second course or being deceived by notional forces. Decrypted message traffic revealed that the Germans consistently overestimated Allied strength by 20%-30%. Normandy. 33 The variety and volume of the means used to "sell" the deception story to the enemy Operational Commander must be broad based, imaginative, and subtle to be effective. In that regard, the Allies succeeded admirably. Part of the Bodyguard lie was to convince the Germans that no invasion need take place in the summer of 1944 because the Allied strategic bombing offensive alone could win the war. To support the lie, Allied diplomats in Lisbon, Madrid, Berne, and Stockholm put forth the idea quietly at cocktail parties, knowing it would reach German intelligence, that "Strategic bombing is succeeding beyond all expectations and will win the war."
34
The Allied press was manipulated to support Bodyguard. To bolster the idea there were not enough landing craft to support an invasion, the press reported that a General Motors labor strike had slowed the production of diesel engines and hence landing craft production. The former part of the story was true, the latter was not 35 . In an unusual event, the British used their press to help save Abwher's head, Admiral Minister Churchill also spoke that day, both reinforcing Eisenhower's remarks. 38 All were planted statements and duly reported in the press to help convince the Germans that Normandy was but a diversion.
At the theater operational level, many creative deceptions contained in Fortitude South helped paint the picture that Pas de Calais was the main invasion site. The best camouflage means possible were used to conceal true troop buildups in southwest England where the majority of invasion forces actually were. However, in southeast England, where the Germans were led to believe that troops bivouacked there were to support the false invasion of Pas de Calais, the camouflage was purposely made less effective so that they would be seen in order to reinforce German preconceptions. 39 Also, deceptive night lighting was portrayed in southeast England to convince the enemy that large troop concentrations were there. 40 The newly created 5 th Wireless Group, a special electronics unit, performed wireless radio deception to enhance FUSAG's legitimacy. With state of the art equipment, a small group of operators could electronically mimic an entire force. These operators were used to simulate the notional forces "exercising" in preparation for the Pas de Calais invasion. 41 To deceive the limited remaining German photoreconnaissance capability, flotillas of dummy landing craft were displayed in the rivers of southeast England to sustain the illusion that FUSAG would attack Pas de Calais 42 while hundreds of dummy rubber airplane shapes were used to portrait the notional XIX Tactical Air
Force that would also support the phony invasion. 43 Lastly, an intense bombing campaign against Pas de Calais was conducted to deceptively "soften up" defenses while correspondingly Normandy beaches received less, although still intense, bomber attention. 44 
Input Signal: Feedback From the Enemy
To complete the idea of deception effectiveness as a input/output model, the input signal back to the friendly Regarding the analytical feedback or that which identifies what action the deception target is taking, the Allies benefited because factor force was in their favor. 48 Because they owned air superiority over western Europe, their photoreconnaissance aircraft could act as a crosscheck to further enhance the validity of Ultra intelligence by confirming whether the Germans were physically doing what their Enigma transmissions said they were doing. French Underground members were also able to provide confirming intelligence as well.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
"All knowledge, however small, however irrelevant to progress and well being, is part of the whole." Vincent Dethier 49 Conclusion: The Allies invaded Normandy under critical circumstances.
To defeat Germany unconditionally the Allies needed a second front that more closely approximated the effort being put forth by the Soviets to the east. The invasion from the west was also needed to finally quell the long standing concern that, without it, the Soviets might seek a separate peace with Germany. However, Normandy was also a dual edged sword in that regard. If the Allied invasion failed, the Germans could have potentially shifted decisive combat power from the western front to the Russian front and possibly forced a negotiated peace with the Soviets. Therefore, the stakes were high as the invasion got underway on June 6, 1944.
German forces arrayed in the west were of such significant magnitude that if they could concentrate at a known invasion site, the Allies could have been defeated. To counter this possibility, the Allies devised deception plan Bodyguard which was designed to present one threat to Pas de Calais and a second that could come anywhere between Scandinavia and northern Italy. This second threat, with its non-specific invasion location was the element that kept German forces from concentrating and thinly spread from Norway to the Adriatic. In essence, Operation Overlord depended upon deception plan Bodyguard to succeed. However, the Allies did not carelessly force themselves into a situation where they were dependent upon deception to succeed. Indeed, they made such decisions with a high degree of confidence due to their 
Conclusion:
The Allies successfully used the press on numerous occasions to further the deception contained in Bodyguard. Whether planting false stories about delayed landing craft production or coopting radio organizations to broadcast pre-recorded supportive Allied messages, the media contributed significantly to the success of Lesson Learned: Control of factor force in one's favor significantly enhances the probability that one's deception plan will work as desired.
When the battlespace can be shaped to one's advantage, Commanders can gather both operational and analytical feedback detailing the functionality of their deception while at the same time denying the enemy Commander the ability to do the same. (Series  XXII) , Box 530, Folder #2, Naval Operational Archives, Washington Naval Yard, Washington, DC, p1. Allied bomber strategic bombing offensive (Code name: Pointblank) was so effective that it might alone win the war against Germany. Therefore, US bombers would be built up in the United Kingdom at the expense of building up assault troops in order to accelerate the bombing offensive. Also the story would convey that German fortifications in Northern France were so formidable that invasion forces must be built up even more before attempting any cross channel invasion, thus pushing any possible invasion date into late 1944. Further, Bodyguard would attempt to convey to the Germans that fewer than expected American divisions were arriving from the United States and were not completely finished with their training (implying extra training time would be needed in England).
Also, that a British manpower shortage was forcing the cannibalization of disbanding under strength divisions to form fewer but fully manned divisions. Also, that there was a shortage of landing craft due to demand for them in the Pacific Theater of Operations which would further delay any cross channel attack. The desired perception was for the Germans to think that the Balkans would be the Allie's spring objective due to the above restrictions. 13 Bacon, p10.
14 Vego, p500.
the Pas de Calais invasion force. In reality, the actual divisions that comprised the FUSAG were really dedicated Normandy invasion forces. Stationed in southeast England, the 9 US and 2 Canadian divisions were purposely exposed and deceptively portrayed to the German intelligence apparatus as Pas de Calais assault troops. The Allies desired the Germans to believe that Pas de Calais was the main invasion point for as long as possible. However, that would became more and more problematic as Normandy progressed. The Allies correctly assumed that as the actual divisions comprising the false FUSAG were observed operating in the Normandy area, the Germans would soon conclude the deception behind FUSAG and, correspondingly, the fact that Pas de Calais was a ruse and Normandy was the real invasion after all. To sustain the lie, once the actual divisions 'rotated out' of FUSAG, the Allies 'replaced' them with the notional nine divisions they had been deceptively portraying to the Germans via false wireless activities, false National Geographic articles, false Orders of Battle passed by double agents, and other means. To further enhance the believability of the fictitious divisions, only credible names known to the Germans were portrayed as leading the FUSAG. Hence, to his displeasure, General Patton was selected as FUSAG's first Commanding General. The net effect was that the Germans still saw FUSAG as fully manned and aimed straight at the heart of Pas de Calais up to six weeks after the Normandy invasion, thus the lie remained intact.
in southern England only 10 to 12, including airborne troops appear to be participating so far. Not a single unit from First United States Army Group, which comprises around 25 large formations has so far been committed. The same holds true of the 10 to 12 combat formations in Scotland (the dummy 4th Army). This suggests that the Army is planning a further large scale operation in the channel area, which one would expect to be aimed at the Pas de Calais.'" was absolute confirmation that the deception had worked exactly as desired. 47 Ibid. , p.28. 48 Critz, p. 13. 49 Dethier, Vincent G. To Know a Fly. San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1962.
